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JOINING BEHIND BARS:
RECONCILING FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 20(A)(1) WITH THE PRISON
LITIGATION REFORM ACT
ERIN KANDELt
INTRODUCTION
In 2007, three male inmates at Johnson State Prison filed a
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against nine female corrections officers.'
The inmates-Paul Tyner, Brian Patrick Malverdi, and Bradford
Lee Bagley-claimed that the female officers observed male
prisoners while the men showered and used the toilets in the
nude.2 The officers purportedly "pat search[ed]" the men while
they were naked, and even "karate chop [ped] them in the groin."'
When the inmates "attempt [ed] to shield their nudity by placing
paper in their cell windows," the officers supposedly threatened
to issue disciplinary reports.
Tyner, Malverdi, and Bagley sought redress in federal court
on behalf of themselves and "the entire class of similarly situated
plaintiffs" at Johnson State Prison.s Proceeding pro se, the three
t Research Editor, St John's Law Review, J.D. Candidate, 2011, St. John's
University School of Law; B.A., 2004, New York University.
' Tyner v. Donald, No. CV 307-075, 2007 WL 4553052, at *1-2 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 19,
2007). In addition to the nine female corrections officers, the Plaintiffs also named
James Donald, Commissioner; Mr. Washington, Warden; the Georgia Department of
Corrections and their rules and regulations as defendants in their complaint. Id. at
*1.
2 Id. at *2.
3Id. (quoting Complaint at 8, Tyner v. Donald, No. CV 307-075, 2007 WL
4553052 (S.D. Ga. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (quoting Complaint at 9-10, Tyner v. Donald, No. CV 307-075, 2007 WL
4553052 (S.D. Ga. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
I Id. (quoting Complaint at 5, Tyner v. Donald, No. CV 307-075, 2007 WL
4553052 (S.D. Ga. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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prisoners joined as plaintiffs by signing and submitting a single
complaint to the District Court in the Southern District of
Georgia.' Each inmate also filed a motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis ("IFP") under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA").
However, because the three prisoners joined in a single
action, the district court dismissed the case before reaching its
merits.8 Following Eleventh Circuit precedent,9 the magistrate
judge ruled that IFP prisoner plaintiffs could not join as
plaintiffs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(1).' 0 The
district court judge agreed." Considering both "the plain
language of the PLRA" and Congress's intent in enacting that
statute, the district court held that Tyner, Malverdi, and Bagley
could not join under Federal Rule 20(a)(1), and that each inmate
must pay the full $350 filing fee.' 2 The court dismissed the case
without prejudice to allow each inmate to pursue his claims and
pay his filing fee individually.13
Cases like Tyner are not unique. The overwhelming majority
of pro se prisoner complaints and appeals, especially those
concerning civil rights and prison condition violations, 4 are filed
6 Id.
' Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2006). See generally Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-10, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 (1996) (codified as
amended in scattered sections). If the court granted their IFP status, the inmates
would only be required to pay part of the court's $350 filing fee up front, while the
remainder of the fee would be drawn from their prison trust accounts over time. See
§ 1915(a)(1), (b)(1)-(2). Further, the inmates reasoned that, since they joined in a
single action under Rule 20(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court
would also permit them to split the $350 filing fee collectively, as opposed to
requiring each inmate to pay a full $350. See Tyner, 2007 WL 4553052, at *1
(quoting Objection to Report and Recommendations at 2-4, Tyner v. Donald, No. CV
307-075, 2007 WL 4553052 (S.D. Ga. 2007)) (describing inmates arguing that they
cannot afford to pay separate filing fees for a joint IFP action and that this
requirement "would constitute a flagrant and egregious 'miscarriage of
justice[ ]' . . . that Congress never intended")).
Tyner, 2007 WL 4553052, at *2.
Id. at *2-3 (citing Hubbard v. Haley, 262 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2001)).
10 Id. at *3. The Magistrate Judge also dismissed the complaint because pro se
plaintiffs proceeding IFP cannot "bring a class action on behalf of other prisoners."
Id.
11 Id. at *1.
12 Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1).
13 Tyner, 2007 WL 4553052, at *2.
14 Civil rights and prison condition cases are the largest and fastest growing
subsets of prisoner litigation. In 2008, prisoners filed nearly 26,000 petitions
concerning civil rights and prison conditions in federal district courts. JAMES C.
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IFP.'5 Moreover, pro se prisoners are some of the most frequent
filers of civil cases in federal courts." In fiscal year 2008, pro se
prisoners filed 50,756 civil complaints in United States district
courts. This represented about nineteen percent of all district
court civil filings, and substantially exceeded the amount of non-
prisoner pro se civil cases.'8 During that same period, almost
twenty-five percent of civil filings in the United States courts of
appeal were filed by pro se prisoners.'9 These cases comprised
the second-largest category of civil appeals considered by federal
courts.20
Given these statistics, federal courts should develop a
uniform approach to cases in which pro se prisoners file both to
proceed IFP under the PLRA and to join in a single action under
Rule 20(a)(1). So far, however, courts have been inconsistent in
their handling of PLRA-Rule 20(a)(1) cases and, consequently,
their treatment of IFP prisoner litigants.2 ' This inconsistency is
largely due to a lack of legislative guidance and confusion among
the courts as to how to approach PLRA-Rule 20(a)(1) cases. Rule
DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES tbl.4.6
(2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAnd
Figures/2008/alljudicialfactsfigures.pdf. This accounted for close to ten percent of all
district court civil filings, and roughly half of the total number of prisoner petitions
filed. Id. at tbl.4.4. Moreover, the number of civil rights and prison condition cases
filed in 2008 increased 12.2% from fiscal year 2007. JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE
OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2008
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 147 tbl.C-2A (2008), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2008/front/JudicialBusi
nespdfversion.pdf [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS]. Like the inmates in Tyner,
many pro se prisoners file civil rights and prison condition cases pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Tyner, 2007 WL 4553052, at *2; FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
RESOURCE GUIDE FOR MANAGING PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION ix (1996),
available at http://www.insd.uscourts.gov/Publications/PrisonerResourceGuide.pdf.
1" See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 14; see also Howard B. Eisenberg,
Rethinking Prisoner Civil Rights Cases and the Provision of Counsel, 17 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 417, 420 n.8 (1993) (finding that, based on a study of three federal district
courts, "[more than [ninety-five percent] of prisoner suits are filed in forma
pauperis" and, "[wlith rare exceptions, all such cases are filed pro se.") (emphasis
omitted). See generally JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 14, at 82 tbl.A-1 (indicating
that nearly eighty percent of cases on the U.S. Supreme Court docket in 2007 were
filed IFP).
16 See infra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
17 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 14, at 78 tbl.S-23.
8 See id.
19 See JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 14, at 45 tbl.S-4.
20 See id.
21 See infra Part III.
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20(a)(1), for its part, does not specify whether joinder by IFP
prisoner plaintiffs is permitted. Generally, the Rule defines a
liberal standard for permissive joinder of persons,22 and the
United States Supreme Court has held that joinder under Rule
20 is "strongly encouraged" where it is "consistent with fairness
to the parties." Yet, it is unclear whether courts should apply
this broad standard in cases where the parties are IFP prisoner
plaintiffs who, in addition to satisfying the requirements of Rule
20,24 must also comply with the PLRA.
Remarkably, the PLRA also does not address joinder by IFP
prisoner plaintiffs. Section 1915 of the Act requires IFP
prisoners to pay "the full amount of a filing fee" for a civil action
or appeal,25 though the fee collected cannot "exceed the amount of
fees permitted by statute" in the particular jurisdiction.2 6
Furthermore, prisoners are assessed "strikes" for each IFP action
that is dismissed as frivolous or malicious, or for failing to state a
claim on which relief can be granted.2 ' After a prisoner incurs
three strikes, he or she may no longer proceed IFP.28
Accordingly, while § 1915's fee and strike assessment schemes
create straightforward standards for single-plaintiff actions, it is
uncertain whether these provisions impact IFP prisoners' ability
to join in a single action. Additionally, § 1915 does not indicate
how courts should assess filing fees and strikes to IFP prisoners
who are permitted to join as plaintiffs under Rule 20(a)(1).
In the absence of guidance from the Supreme Court or
Congress, federal courts have adopted conflicting approaches to
cases involving joinder by IFP prisoner plaintiffs. Some courts,
like Tyner, interpret the PLRA and Rule 20 as creating a per se
rule barring joinder by IFP prisoner plaintiffs.2 9 Other courts
reconcile the PLRA and Rule 20 by allowing IFP prisoner
22 See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1); see infra Part I.
23 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966), superseded by
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006).
2' See FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1).
22 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (2006).
26 Id. § 1915(b)(3).
27 Id. § 1915(g).
21 Id. That said, under § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes may still file to
proceed IFP if the prisoner "is under imminent danger of serious physical injury." Id.
21 See infra Part III.A.1; see, e.g., Hubbard v. Haley, 262 F.3d 1194, 1195 (11th
Cir. 2001).
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plaintiffs to join as long as each plaintiff pays a full filing fee. 0
Finally, one circuit court has held that IFP prisoner plaintiffs
may join under Rule 20 and pay a collective filing fee.3'
These contradictory outcomes create uncertainty in the
courts and inequity in the treatment of pro se prisoners. For
example, while the court in Tyner barred the three inmates from
joining as plaintiffs and assessed each inmate $350 in filing
fees, 32 similarly-situated prisoner-plaintiffs in others circuits
would be assessed the same fees but would also be permitted to
join as plaintiffs under Rule 20(a)(1).3 3 While this outcome would
not reduce the cost of filing an IFP action, the joined prisoners
would enjoy the less-tangible benefits of Rule 20 joinder, such as
the ability to divide up the responsibilities of litigating a claim
pro se. Similarly, prisoners who are not only permitted to join,
but also to split one filing fee," would have a clear financial
advantage over the prisoners in Tyner. Had the Tyner court
followed this approach, each of the three inmates could have
saved over $233 in filing fees." These savings would likely have
been significant given that the inmates claimed that they could
not afford to pay individual $350 filing fees from their prison
trust accounts.
Despite their disparate outcomes, courts have used the same
four tools of statutory interpretation to determine whether IFP
prisoners may join as plaintiffs under Rule 20(a)(1).3 First,
courts consider the plain meaning of the text of PLRA and the
text of Rule 20(a)(1).3 8 Second, courts look to Congress's intent in
30 See infra Part III.A.2; see, e.g., Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 150, 155 (3d
Cir. 2009), amended by No. 07-1412, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 14156 (3d Cir. June 29,
2009); Boriboune v. Berge, 391 F.3d 852, 855-56 (7th Cir. 2004).
3 See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1137-38 (6th Cir. 1997).
" Tyner v. Donald, No. CV 307-075, 2007 WL 4553052, at *1-2 (S.D. Ga. Dec.
19, 2007).
1 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
31 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
3 See Tyner, 2007 WL 4553052, at *1.
36 Id. While the PLRA provides the procedure by which courts may grant IFP
status, the statute does not set out any criteria for determining the level of poverty a
prisoner must demonstrate in order to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)-(2)
(2006); FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 14, at 17 (finding that "recourse to pre-PLRA
case law may be helpful" in determining what qualifies as "indigence for IFP
purposes" under the PLRA).
* See infra Part III.
3 See infra Part III.A.
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promulgating the PLRA and its IFP provisions.3 9 Third, courts
apply the implied repeals analysis to determine if the PLRA
repealed or altered Rule 20(a)(1) by implication.40 Finally, courts
discuss-and in some cases, debunk-the public policy concerns
raised by joinder of IFP prisoners."
This Note explores the courts' competing approaches to cases
involving joinder by IFP prisoners and endeavors to resolve this
troublesome procedural issue. Part I of this Note reviews the
history and purpose of Rule 20(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.42 Part II discusses the legislative history and scope of
the PLRA, focusing primarily on the IFP provisions contained in
§ 1915.43 Part III examines how courts have used the same four
interpretive tools-plain meaning, legislative intent, implied
repeals, and public policy arguments-to support three
conflicting outcomes in PLRA-Rule 20(a)(1) cases: a per se rule
against joinder, joinder with individual filing fees, and joinder
with a collective filing fee.44 Part III also analyzes the Supreme
Court's decision in Jones v. Bock,4 5 where the Court used these
four interpretive tools to resolve a separate conflict between the
PLRA and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4 6 This Part also
asserts that, in light of its decision in Jones, the Court would
likely permit joinder by IFP prisoner plaintiffs.4 7 However, Part
IV.A argues that until the Court issues such a ruling, or
Congress amends the PLRA to address joinder, it is best for lower
courts to permit IFP prisoners to join as plaintiffs and pay a
collective filing fee.48  Finally, Part IV.B urges the Supreme
Court to resolve the split among the circuit courts by determining
whether IFP prisoner plaintiffs may join in a single action.4 9
3 See infra Part III.B.
40 See infra Part III.C.
4 See infra Part III.D.
4 See infra Part I.
a See infra Part II.
4 See infra Part III.
4 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
46 See infra Part III.E.
4 See infra Part III.E.
48 See infra Part IV.A.
4 See infra Part IV.B.
[Vol. 85:755760
JOINING BEHIND BARS
I. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF RULE 20
Rule 20 outlines the requirements for "permissive joinder" of
parties.o Consistent with the Rule's origin as an equitable
remedy,5 ' the criteria for permissive joinder are based on
practical considerations,52 and "not on arcane historic
formulations of legal relationships."" This pragmatic approach
underlies the Rule's main objective: to promote trial convenience
and efficiency.54 With this purpose in mind, courts have liberally
construed Rule 20 to entertain a broad scope of litigation that is
"consistent with fairness to the parties" involved in a joint
action.5 Courts' broad discretion to allow joinder, however, is
balanced by a complementary discretion under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure to deny joinder in the interest of fairness. 6
" See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 20. Since the promulgation of the Federal Rules
in 1938, Rule 20 has undergone only minor amendments. See 4 JAMES WM. MOORE
ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 20App.101-02 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing the
1966, 1987, and 2007 amendments to Rule 20).
s' See 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1651, at 390-91 (4th ed. 2008); MOORE, supra note 50, If 20App.100. Where
common law courts looked only to the substantive rights of parties to determine
whether joinder was proper, federal equity courts considered joinder in terms of
"judicial economy and trial convenience." WRIGHT, supra, at 390; MOORE, supra note
50, 1[ 20App.100. Indeed, with the adoption of the Equity Rules of 1912, trial
convenience had become the "sole criterion" for courts to evaluate joinder by parties
who shared a common interest in an action. WRIGHT, supra, at 394. According to the
original Advisory Committee Note, Rule 20 represented "only a moderate expansion"
of this federal equity practice "to cover both law and equity actions." FED. R. Civ. P.
20 advisory committee's note.
52 See MOORE, supra note 50, 120.02[1][a], at 20-5 (finding that Rule 20
encourages comprehensive resolution of disputes, deters overlapping litigation,
saves time and money for the parties and the court trying the case, and helps avoid
inconsistent outcomes by binding all joined parties in a single judgment); see also,
e.g., Pujol v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 877 F.2d 132, 134 (1st Cir. 1989) (joinder
results in economies of scale); League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 558 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1977) (joinder necessary for parties to obtain
complete relief in single proceeding); Mosley v. Gen. Motors Corp. 497 F.2d 1330,
1332 (8th Cir. 1974) (joinder "expedite[s] the final determination of disputes, thereby
preventing multiple lawsuits").
5 MOORE,supra note 50, 20.02[11 [al, at 20-5.
" See id. at 20-5 to 20-6; WRIGHT, supra note 51, § 1652, at 395; see also, e.g.,
Saval v. BL Ltd., 710 F.2d 1027, 1031 (4th Cir. 1983) (finding that Rule 20 "should
be construed in light of its purpose" to promote trial convenience and efficiency);
League to Save Lake Tahoe, 558 F.2d at 917; Mosley, 497 F.2d at 1332.
" United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966); see also League to
Save Lake Tahoe, 558 F.2d at 917; Mosley, 497 F.2d at 1332.
" See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
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Rule 20(a)(1) governs the permissive joinder of plaintiffs in a
single action.57 Like the whole of Rule 20, section (a)(1) is
"permissive in character."58 Thus, the Rule permits the joinder of
plaintiffs "whose presence is procedurally convenient but is not
regarded as essential to the court's complete disposition of any
particular claim."59 On the threshold level, joinder is proper if
the plaintiffs' claims both arise out of the same transaction and
share a common question of law or fact. 0  These two
requirements are cumulative, and joinder is not proper unless
both are satisfied.6 ' That said, they are "flexible concepts" and
there are no bright-line rules for either prong of this two-part
inquiry.62 In practice, the common-question requirement is
usually not difficult to satisfy since multiple plaintiffs do not
typically join in a single action unless there is some commonality
among them. Meanwhile, courts generally assess transactional
relatedness on a case-by-case basis to determine "whether, in
view of the theories asserted and the facts alleged in each case,
joinder is fair."64
Even if plaintiffs' claims satisfy the common-question and
transactional relatedness tests, federal courts still have the
discretion to disallow joinder. Accordingly, once Rule 20(a)(1)'s
threshold requirements are met, courts must consider the
a FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1) ("Persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if:
(A) they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect
to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in
the action.").
'8 See WRIGHT, supra note 51, § 1652, at 395-96.
" Id. at 397.
60 FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1); see Desert Empire Bank v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 623
F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding that "Rule 20(a) imposes two specific
requirements for the permissive joinder of parties"); League to Save Lake Tahoe, 558
F.2d at 917 (same); Mosley, 497 F.2d at 1333 (same).
61 MOORE, supra note 50, 1 20.04[1], at 20-28; WRIGHT, supra note 51, § 1653, at
401-04; see cases cited supra note 60.
62 WRIGHT, supra note 51, § 1653, at 415.
6 MOORE, supra note 50, 20.04[1], at 20-28 to 20-29.
4 Id. 91 20.05 ("In other words, although there might be different occurrences,
the claims involve enough related operative facts to make joinder in a single case
fair."); see Mosley, 497 F.2d at 1333 (8th Cir. 1974) (finding that there are "[nlo hard
and fast rules" for transactional relatedness and that courts take a "a case by case
approach" in assessing this prong of Rule 20(a)).
65 See WRIGHT, supra note 51, § 1652, at 395-96; see, e.g., Saval v. BL Ltd., 710
F.2d 1027, 1031 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that the standard of review is whether
district court abused discretion in denying joinder).
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possibility of prejudice and "other relevant factors in a case" to
determine whether permissive joinder would "comport with the
principles of fundamental fairness."6 6 Thus, if a court determines
that the addition of a plaintiff will not foster Rule 20's objective
of trial convenience, but will instead result in "embarrassment,
delay, expense, or other prejudice" to the parties, that court may
deny joinder and order separate trials under Rule 20(b)67 or Rule
42(b). 8 Similarly, if a court finds that plaintiffs have been
improperly joined under Rule 20(a)(1), it may sever the joint
action and direct each plaintiff to file a separate claim."
II. HISTORY AND SCOPE OF THE PLRA
Before the enactment of the PLRA, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 set
somewhat lenient standards for IFP prisoner litigation.70 Under
the pre-PLRA statute, courts were authorized to "waive all fees
and costs" for prisoners filing to proceed IFP for a civil complaint
or appeal." If courts determined that a prisoner must pay a
filing fee, courts still had the discretion to allow that prisoner to
proceed without prepayment of the fee, or to require the prisoner
to make a partial payment of the filing fee as funds became
6 Desert Empire Bank v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 623 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir.
1980).
67 FED. R. CIv. P. 20(b); see, e.g., Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 631
(7th Cir. 2001) (affirming district court's discretion to deny "joinder where it would
cause delay, prejudice, or expense"); Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271,
1296 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that, under Rule 20(b), a district court may order
separate trials "to avoid prejudice").
68 FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b) ("For convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and
economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues,
claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims."). If a court orders
separate trials under Rule 20(b) or Rule 42(b), plaintiffs do not file separate cases;
instead, the court conducts a "separate factual inquiry of claims or issues in the
context of a single, properly joined case." MOORE, supra note 50, [ 20.02[6] [c], at 20-
25.
6 See FED. R. Civ. P. 21; see MOORE, supra note 50, [ 20.02[6] [c], at 20-25 ("If
the court orders severance, claims against misjoined parties are dropped and
pursued in a separate action or actions.").
70 See Marie Cordisco, Pre-PLRA Survey Reflects Courts' Experiences with
Assessing Partial Filing Fees in In Forma Pauperis Cases, FJC DIRECTIONS, no. 9,
June 1996, at 25.
71 Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2006); FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 14, at 15.
Moreover, to be considered for IFP status under the former Act, prisoners only
needed to submit an affidavit stating that they were "unable to pay" the fee or any
portion thereof. See § 1915(a)(1).
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available.72 Moreover, the pre-PLRA statute authorized, but did
not require, courts to dismiss cases that were frivolous or
malicious.73 The statute also did not allow any sanctions against
prisoners who filed complaints or appeals that were frivolous or
malicious, or failed to state a claim.
By the mid-1990s, Congress determined that § 1915 was in
need of an overhaul. Concerned by "the alarming explosion in
the number of frivolous lawsuits filed by State and Federal
prisoners," the House of Representatives and the Senate swiftly
passed the PLRA. 6 According to the Act's sparse legislative
history," one of the main objectives of the PLRA was to "curtail
frivolous prisoner litigation." To achieve that goal, Congress
made extensive changes to § 1915 to "establish[ I procedural
hurdles that [would] prevent frivolous lawsuits."
Primarily, Congress amended § 1915 to require prisoners
proceeding IFP "to pay the full amount of a filing fee."80 Under
§ 1915(b)(1), courts no longer have the discretion to waive
payment of the filing fee.8 ' Instead, courts must collect an initial
total or partial fee from IFP prisoners once they file a complaint
or appeal.82 Under § 1915(b)(4), prisoners who have "no assets
and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee" will
not be prohibited from bringing an IFP action or appeal because
of their indigence. However, prisoners with insufficient funds
72 Cordisco, supra note 70.
7 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 14, at 15.
74 E.g., 141 CONG. REC. S7,524 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
7 141 CONG. REC. S14,413 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
76 "The 104th Congress ... commenced work on the PLRA in February 1995 and
passed it as a rider to an omnibus appropriations bill signed into law by President
Clinton on April 26, 1996." B. Patrick Costello, Jr., "Imminent Danger" Within
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act: Are Congress and Courts
Being Realistic?, 29 J. LEGIS. 1, 4 (2002).
77 See id.; Lynn S. Branham, The Prison Litigation Reform Act's Enigmatic
Exhaustion Requirement: What It Means and What Congress, Courts and
Correctional Officials Can Learn from It, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 483, 488 n.12 (2001)
(finding that, beyond one "House Report, the PLRA's legislative history consists
primarily of isolated comments of legislators found in the Congressional Record
and the testimony of witnesses during hearings in the Senate and House of
Representatives").
78 141 CONG. REC. S7,525 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
7 141 CONG. REc. 27,044 (1995) (statement of Sen. Reid).
so 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (2006).
" Id.; see supra text accompanying note 72.
82 Id. § 1915(b)(1).
- Id. § 1915(b)(4).
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must still pay the entire filing fee over time, and § 1915(b)(1)
contains a formula for courts to assess that fee in installments. 4
After the initial filing fee is paid, prisoners must make monthly
payments of twenty percent of the preceding month's income
credited to the prisoner's account until the full filing fee has been
paid." Finally, the amount of the filing fee the court can collect
from an IFP prisoner is tempered by § 1915(b)(3), which states
that the filing fee collected cannot "exceed the amount of fees
permitted by statute for the commencement of a civil action or an
appeal of a civil action or criminal judgment."
According to PLRA proponents, requiring prisoners to pay a
full filing fee served three related purposes. First, it eliminated
any preferential treatment of prisoners by putting them on a
level economic playing field with average "law-abiding citizens"
who pay their own litigation costs.87  Second, it required
prisoners to financially contribute to the large burden prisoner
litigation places on the federal judiciary system. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, it provided a much-needed "economic
disincentive" to prisoner litigation that was lacking from the
original statute.89  Not requiring a filing fee, PLRA proponents
reasoned, motivated prisoners to file non-meritorious suits.90
Alternatively, requiring a filing fee would "force prisoners to
think twice about the case and not just file reflexively."9'
Moreover, Congress amended § 1915 to prohibit prisoners
from proceeding IFP if they have filed too many frivolous IFP
actions or appeals in the past.9 2 Under § 1915(g), commonly
8 Id. § 1915(b)(1) ("The court shall assess and, when funds exist, collect, as a
partial payment of any court fees required by law, an initial partial filing fee of
[twenty] percent of the greater of (A) the average monthly deposits to the prisoner's
account; or (B) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the [six]
month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or notice of appeal.").
85 Id. § 1915(b)(2). These monthly payments are forwarded to the court by the
penal institution that has custody of the prisoner each time the prisoners trust
account contains more than ten dollars. Id.
86 Id. § 1915(b)(3).
87 141 CONG. REC. 27,042 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
8 141 CONG. REC. 27,042 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
89 141 CONG. REC. S7,525 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
9o See id.
91 141 CONG. REc. 14,572 (1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl). As Senator Bob Dole
put it, "when prisoners know that they will have to pay these costs-perhaps not at
the time of filing, but eventually-they will be less inclined to file a lawsuit in the
first place." 141 CONG. REC. 14,571 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
92 See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
2011] 765
ST. JOHN'S LAWREVIEW
known as the "three strikes rule," prisoners may not proceed IFP
if they have filed three or more IFP actions or appeals that were
dismissed as frivolous or malicious, or for failing to state a
claim." Further, where courts had the option to dismiss
frivolous IFP actions under the pre-PLRA statute," § 1915(e)(2)
creates an affirmative obligation to dismiss. Thus, if a prisoner
files an IFP action or appeal that a court considers frivolous or
malicious, or that fails to state a claim, the court must dismiss
the action or appeal.96 Finally, under the statute, courts must
also assess new strikes to IFP prisoners whose actions or appeals
are dismissed.97 To that end, prisoners can incur multiple strikes
in the course of litigating one matter; since filing a complaint and
appealing its dismissal are separate actions, courts have held
that a prisoner in this scenario can incur two strikes.98
Finally, outside of amending § 1915, Congress also enacted
provisions in the PLRA to deter frivolous litigation from the
general prisoner population, not just those prisoners proceeding
IFP.99 The revocation of "good-time credits" is one example. 00
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1932, courts may, on their own motion or
otherwise, revoke the unvested "good time credit" or sentencing
reductions of any adult prisoner who brings a civil action if the
court finds that the claim was filed for malicious purposes or
solely to harass the other party.'01 The legislative history of the
PLRA does not describe this provision in terms of the deterrence
it would achieve. Proponents of the PLRA, however,
characterized § 1932 as an appropriate "punish[ment]" for
prisoners "who waste taxpayer dollars and valuable judicial
resources with unnecessary lawsuits."'0 2
" 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2006).
94 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 14, at 15.
95 § 1915(e)(2).
96 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 14, at 16. Remarkably, in the legislative
history of the PLRA, Congress did not discuss its intent in enacting § 1915(g). That
said, the provision's language and application in federal courts demonstrate that it
was designed to curb frivolous filings of prisoner IFP actions.
97 See id.
9 See, e.g., George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 608 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that
defendant incurred two strikes in a single litigation, "one for filing a complaint
containing a frivolous claim, another for an appeal raising at least one frivolous
objection to the district court's ruling").
9 E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1932 (2006).
'0 141 CONG. REC. 26,548-49 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
101 § 1932; see FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 14, at 4.
102 141 CONG. REC. 14,571 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
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III. COURTs' ANALYSIS OF RULE 20(A)(1) AND THE PLRA: FOUR
INTERPRETIVE TOOLS
Although the legislative history of the PLRA demonstrates
Congress's goal to deter frivolous prisoner litigation, it does not
address whether joinder by IFP prisoners would further or
undermine that objective. Similarly, neither the text of Rule
20(a)(1) nor the text of the PLRA contain any reference to joinder
by IFP prisoner plaintiffs. Given this lack of guidance, courts
have resorted to their own methods of resolving cases in which
IFP prisoners seek to join as plaintiffs under Rule 20(a)(1). Some
courts have adopted a per se rule barring joinder by IFP prisoner
plaintiffs.103 Meanwhile, other courts have allowed IFP prisoner
plaintiffs to join as long as each plaintiff pays a full filing fee.'
Finally, one court has held that IFP prisoner plaintiffs may join
under Rule 20 and pay a collective filing fee. 0 s
While courts differ in their approaches to PLRA-Rule
20(a)(1) cases, they use the same four interpretive tools to
support their rationales: (1) plain meaning; (2) legislative intent;
(3) implied repeals; and (4) public policy arguments. This Part
examines how courts have applied each of these analytical tools
to reach three different results. Part III.A considers the use of
plain meaning, which has been the courts' dominant approach to
PLRA-Rule 20(a)(1) cases.' Part III.B analyzes the application
of legislative intent.'0 7 Part III.C describes the implied repeals
analysis and its role in the PLRA-Rule 20(a)(1) debate.' Part
III.D examines the public policy concerns raised by joinder of IFP
prisoner plaintiffs.' Finally, Part III.E examines Jones v.
Bock,110 a recent case where the Supreme Court applied the same
four interpretive tools to resolve a different conflict between the
PLRA and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."' Although
103 See, e.g., Hubbard v. Haley, 262 F.3d 1194, 1198 (11th Cir. 2001).
104 See, e.g., Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 155 (3d Cir. 2009); Boriboune v.
Berge, 391 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 2004).
10' See, e.g., In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1138 (6th Cir. 1997).
106 See infra Part III.A.
107 See infra Part III.B.
10" See infra Part III.C.
109 See infra Part III.D.
o 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
u" See infra Part III.E. See generally Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
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Jones does not directly address the PLRA-Rule 20(a)(1) conflict,
Part III.E asserts that the decision may be predictive of how the
Court would likely approach and resolve this procedural issue.1 12
A. Plain Meaning
To determine whether IFP prisoner plaintiffs may join in a
single action, courts have examined the PLRA and Rule 20(a)(1)
for their plain meaning.13  The basis of the plain meaning
doctrine is that, when the text of a statute or Rule is "clear and
unambiguous," courts should look no further than the plain
meaning of the text."4 In other words, courts should give effect
to meanings that are "apparent on the face of the text" without
reference to external sources or interpretative aids."5 Plain
meaning has been courts' dominant approach to resolving PLRA-
Rule 20(a)(1) cases; accordingly, courts on every side of the issue
have used plain meaning to support their rationales for and
against joinder by IFP prisoner litigants."' Part III.A.1 will
examine courts' use of plain meaning to support a per se rule
barring joinder by IFP prisoner plaintiffs."' Part III.A.2 will
consider courts' application of plain meaning to support joinder
by IFP prisoner plaintiffs with individual filing fees."18  Part
III.A.3 will analyze courts' use of plain meaning to support
joinder by IFP prisoner plaintiffs with a collective filing fee."19
1. Plain Meaning Supporting a Per Se Rule Against Joinder
Primarily, courts that adopted a per se rule against joinder
have asserted that, since the plain meaning of § 1915(b)(1) of the
PLRA requires that each IFP prisoner pay a full individual filing
fee, IFP prisoner plaintiffs may not join under Rule 20(a)(1).12 0
The Eleventh Circuit is the only circuit court to espouse this
n2 See infra Part III.E.
See, e.g., Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 152, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) (analyzing
the "plain language" of Rule 20 and the PLRA); Hubbard v. Haley, 262 F.3d 1194,
1198 (11th Cir. 2001) (examining "the plain language of the PLRA").
11 Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc'ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 540-41
(1991).
115 CHRISTIAN E. MAMMEN, USING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN AMERICAN
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 12 (2002).
1no See infra Part III.A.
n1 See infra Part III.A.1.
us See infra Part III.A.2.
n9 See infra Part III.A.3.
120 See infra notes 121-35 and accompanying text.
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approach.12 ' In Hubbard v. Haley, 22 the Eleventh Circuit
determined that IFP prisoner plaintiffs may not join in a single
action because "the clear language of the PLRA" requires each
IFP prisoner to pay individual civil and appellate filing fees. 23
Noting that questions of statutory interpretation should begin
and end "'with the words of the statutory provision,' "124 the court
looked primarily at the text of § 1915(b)(1), which requires IFP
prisoners "to pay the full amount of a filing fee." 2 5 The plain
meaning of this provision, the court reasoned, "clearly and
unambiguously requires" each IFP prisoner plaintiff to pay
individual filing fees for both civil actions and appeals.126
Consequently, the court found that, in order to meet this
requirement, IFP prisoner plaintiffs must bring separate suits
and cannot join in a single action under Rule 20(a)( 1).127
Several district courts have adopted Hubbard's plain
meaning interpretation of the PLRA.12 8 In Swenson v.
MacDonald,2 9 the U.S. Court for the District of Montana
broadened Hubbard's analysis by assessing the plain language of
both the PLRA and Rule 20(a)(1)."a0 The court compared the
"permissive" language of Rule 20(a)(1) with the PLRA's
"mandatory" fee payment scheme, finding that, while plaintiffs
121 See generally Hubbard v. Haley, 262 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2001); see also
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (2006).
122 262 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2001).
123 Id. at 1198. In Hubbard, eighteen Alabama state prisoners filed a § 1983
action against their correctional facility and various prison officials, alleging
violations of their Eighth Amendment rights. Id. at 1195. The district court
dismissed the case before reaching the merits, holding that, because the prisoners
sought to proceed IFP, each Plaintiff had to file a separate complaint and pay a
separate filing fee. Id. at 1198. Likewise, the district court changed the Plaintiffs'
joint notice of appeal to a singular notice, and assessed the appellate filing fee
against the first Plaintiff listed on the complaint. Id.
124 Id. at 1197 (quoting Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 972 (11th Cir. 2000) (en
banc)).
125 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (2006).
126 Hubbard, 262 F.3d at 1197.
127 Id. at 1197-98. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the multi-
plaintiff IFP action, holding that plaintiffs must file separate suits and pay
individual filing fees for both a civil action and an appeal. Id. at 1198.
128 See, e.g., Mackey v. Walker, No. CV 108-129, 2008 WL 4657879, at *2 (S.D.
Ga. Oct. 21, 2008); Tyner v. Donald, No. CV 307-075, 2007 WL 4553052, at *3 (S.D.
Ga. Dec. 19, 2007); Lawson v. Sizemore, No. Civ.A. 05-CV-108-KKC, 2005 WL
1514310, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Ky. June 24, 2005).
129 No. CV 05-93-GF-CSO, 2006 WL 240233 (D. Mont. Jan. 30, 2006).
130 Id. at *2.
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"may join their claims in one action" under Rule 20(a)(1), they
still "must pay" a full individual filing fee under § 1915(b)(1).13 1
The Swenson court also considered the mandatory language of
§ 1915(b)(3), which states that "the amount of the fee collected
must not exceed the fee imposed for 'commencement of a civil
action.' "132 According to Swenson, courts could not both adhere
to the plain meaning of § 1915(b)(1), which requires each IFP
prisoner to pay an individual filing fee, and allow joinder under
Rule 20(a)(1) without "running afoul of § 1915(b)(3)'s" mandatory
limitation on the total fee a court can collect for a single action.1 33
As a result, the court adopted "Hubbard's severance solution,"134
holding that each IFP plaintiff must pursue his case separately
and pay an individual filing fee.135
2. Plain Meaning Supporting Joinder with Individual Filing
Fees
Alternatively, some circuit courts have used plain meaning
to show that IFP prisoner plaintiffs may join in a single action if
each prisoner pays an individual filing fee.'13  Like the Eleventh
Circuit in Hubbard,137 these other circuit courts found that the
plain meaning of § 1915(b)(1) requires each prisoner to pay an
individual filing fee.as To emphasize this point, the Seventh
Circuit in Boriboune v. Bergel39 compared the plain language of
§ 1915(b)(1) with § 1914(a), which governs filing fees in district
131 Id.
132 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(3) (2006)).
I Swenson, 2006 WL 240233, at *2. In other words, the court concluded that,
when read together, the compulsory language of § 1915(b)(1) and (b)(3) impliedly
negated IFP prisoners' option to join as plaintiffs under Rule 20(a)(1). Id. See also
Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 161 (3d. Cir. 2009) (Jordan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (arguing that allowing prisoners to join in a single suit and
pay individual filing fees "creates an 'event' that we are instructed should in no
event be created" by the "reasonably" plain language of the PLRA).
114 Swenson, 2006 WL 240233, at *2.
1 Id. at *4-5.
136 See infra notes 137-59 and accompanying text.
1 262 F.3d 1194, 1197 (11th Cir. 2001).
"s See, e.g., Boriboune v. Berge, 391 F.3d 852, 855 (7th Cir. 2004). Indeed, in his
majority opinion in Boriboune, Judge Easterbrook asserted that it was "hard to read
[the] language [of § 1915(b)(1)] any other way." Id.
"' 391 F.3d 852. In Boriboune, the district court dismissed a joint § 1983 action
.by four inmates at a top-security Wisconsin prison who applied to proceed IFP and
to join as plaintiffs in a single action. Id. at 853.
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courts.14 0  The court noted that § 1914(a) requires "'parties
instituting any civil action'" to pay a filing fee. 14 1 The use of the
plural "parties," the court reasoned, implies that, under this
statute, courts should assess filing fees "per case rather than per
litigant."42 By contrast, § 1915(b)(1) requires "a prisoner" who
brings a civil action to pay "the full amount of a filing fee.""
Given the statute's reference to a singular "prisoner," the court
determined that the plain meaning of § 1915(b)(1) "specifies a
per-litigant approach" to the payment of filing fees for IFP
prisoner actions.144
However, Boriboune did not adopt Hubbard's "no-joinder"
rule.14 5 Instead, the court held that IFP prisoners may join as
plaintiffs under Rule 20(a)(1) as long as each prisoner plaintiff
pays an individual filing fee and the "criteria of permissive
joinder are satisfied."4 6  The Third Circuit adopted a similar
position in Hagan v. Rogers.147 There, the court overturned the
lower court's ruling that prisoners are "categorically excluded
from Rule 20" joinder.148 Like Boriboune, the Hagan court found
that, even if "[tihe plain language of § 1915(b)(1)" requires each
IFP prisoner to pay an individual filing fee, these plaintiffs may
still join in a single action under Rule 20(a)(1).149
In Hagan, the majority invoked three plain meaning
arguments to support this approach. First, the court contended
that, because the text of the PLRA "does not mention Rule 20 or
joint litigation," the plain meaning of the Act cannot be construed
140 Id. at 855-56. "The clerk of each district court shall require the parties
instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in such court, whether by original
process, removal or otherwise, to pay a filing fee of $150 except that on application
for a writ of habeas corpus the filing fee shall be [five dollars]." Id. (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2006)). After the Boriboune decision, the filing fee of $150 was
increased by the amendments in Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 307, 118 Stat. 2809, 2895
(2004) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2006)).
141 Boriboune, 391 F.3d at 855 (quoting § 1914(a)).
142 See id.
14 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)
(2006)).
1" Boriboune, 391 F.3d at 856 (reasoning that this "approach is a natural
concomitant to a system that makes permission to proceed in forma
pauperis . .. contingent on certain person-specific findings," such as the balance of a
prisoner's trust account).
145 Id.
146 Id. at 855.
147 570 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 2009).
n Id. at 152-53.
141 Id. at 155 & n.2.
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as forbidding joinder by IFP prisoner plaintiffs.' Second, it
asserted that the plain meaning of § 1915(b)(3) does not
implicitly bar joinder by IFP prisoners.'s' Unlike the district
court in Swenson,15 ' the Hagan majority reasoned that
§ 1915(b)(3) should not be read as limiting the total fee courts can
collect for an IFP action.153 Alternatively, the court found that
§ 1915(b)(3) "merely ensures that an IFP prisoner's fees, when
paid by installment, will not exceed the standard individual filing
fee paid in full."'5 4 This interpretation, the court concluded,
"harmonizes the PLRA with Rule 20" to allow joinder by IFP
prisoner plaintiffs. "
Finally, Hagan reasoned that the plain meaning of Rule
20(a)(1) permits joinder by IFP prisoner plaintiffs.' The
majority noted that, according to Supreme Court precedent, Rule
20 should be given its plain meaning if its text is "'clear and
unambiguous.' "" The court then examined the text of Rule
20(a)(1), and found that "[niothing in the plain language
of. . . Rule [20] indicates that prisoners are excluded as 'persons'
permitted to join as plaintiffs."5 8 Consequently, the court held
that prisoners should be included in the "broad definition of
persons capable of joining their claim pursuant to .. . Rule
[20]."
"o Id. at 154-55; see also Boriboune v. Berge, 391 F.3d 852, 854 (7th Cir. 2004)
("The PLRA does not mention Rule 20 or joint litigation."). This point was also
crucial to the Seventh and Third Circuits' examination of the implied repeals
analysis. See infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
m Hagan, 570 F.3d at 155.
152 No. CV 05-93-GF-CSO, 2006 WL 240233 (D. Mont. Jan. 30, 2006); see supra
notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
" Hagan, 570 F.3d at 155; see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(3) (2006).
* Hagan, 570 F.3d at 155. Judge Jordan disagreed with the Hagan majority's
view that § 1915(b)(3) permits courts to assess individual filing fees in joint IFP
actions. Id. at 161 (Jordan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also
supra note 133. That said, he admitted that this interpretation "is at least a
plausible reading of the statute" where the alternative would be for the PLRA to
repeal Rule 20 by implication. Id. at 162. See infra Part III.C.
1 Hagan, 570 F.3d at 155-56.
'n Id. at 153.
m Id. at 157 (quoting Berckeley Inv. Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 259 F.3d 135, 142
n.7 (3d Cir. 2001)).
15 Id. at 153.
159 Id. at 157.
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3. Plain Meaning Supporting Joinder with a Collective Filing
Fee
The Sixth Circuit is the only court to find that IFP prisoners
may both join as plaintiffs and pay a collective filing fee under
PLRA.6 0  In In re Prison Litigation Reform Act, 1 6 1 the Chief
Judge of the Sixth Circuit issued an administrative order
suggesting that each IFP prisoner in a joint action should pay a
portion of the filing fee. 162 While the order did not engage in a
lengthy analysis of the plain meaning of PLRA, it referenced the
text of the statute, noting that it "does not specify how fees are to
be assessed when multiple prisoners constitute the plaintiffs or
appellants."163 The court ultimately concluded that the filing fee
should "be equally divided" among all the IFP prisoner plaintiffs
in a joint action.164
The Sixth Circuit's interpretation has garnered support from
other courts.165 In her opinion in Hagan, Judge Roth disagreed
with the majority's holding that § 1915(b)(1) requires each IFP
prisoner to pay a full filing fee."' Instead, Roth argued that the
plain meaning of § 1915(b)(1) allows "each prisoner [to] pay an
apportioned amount" of a filing fee.'6 1 Similar to the Seventh
Circuit in Boriboune,16' Roth based her interpretation of
160 See In re Prisoner Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1137-38 (6th Cir. 1997);
cf Talley-Bey v. Knebl, 168 F.3d 884, 885 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that, for the
purposes of the PLRA, "when a district court imposes fees and costs upon multiple
prisoners, the fees and costs are to be proportionally assessed among the prisoners").
161 105 F.3d 1131 (6th Cir. 1997).
162 Id. at 1137-38.
* Id. at 1137.
1 Id. at 1138. The Chief Judge, however, qualified this holding as a temporary
measure "to assure uniformity throughout the Sixth Circuit . .. until such time as
panels of this court have the opportunity to address the numerous issues raised by
the [PLRA]." Id. at 1131. Consequently, at least one district court has questioned
whether the law within the Sixth Circuit is settled concerning the apportionment of
a collective filing fee in joint IFP actions. See, e.g., Lawson v. Sizemore, No. Civ.A.
05-CV-108-KKC, 2005 WL 1514310, at *1, n.1 (E.D. Ky. June 24, 2005) ("No panel of
the Sixth Circuit has yet squarely addressed the multiple-in forma pauperis-
prisoner-plaintiff-PLRA filing fee issue"). That said, the Lawson court did not
question the permissibility of joinder by IFP prisoner plaintiffs.
165 Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 165 (3d Cir. 2009) (Roth, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (citing Talley-Bey v. Knebl, 168 F.3d 884, 885 (6th Cir.
1999)).
16 Id. at 164 (arguing that the majority's holding "violates 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(3)
and misconstrues 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)").
167 Id.
16 See supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
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§ 1915(b)(1) on a grammatical nuance in the statutory text.'
She concluded that "Congress's use of 'a' instead of 'the'" before
the phrase "filing fee" in § 1915(b)(1) demonstrates that joint IFP
litigants may pay a collective fee.170 This "subtle difference,"
Roth argued, shows both that the PLRA requires one total filing
fee and that IFP prisoners who join under Rule 20(a)(1) may
satisfy this requirement by each paying an apportioned amount
of that fee.171 Accordingly, this plain language interpretation
"would satisfy both § 1915(b)(1), because each prisoner would pay
a full filing fee, and § 1915(b)(3), because the prisoners together
would pay only one . . . fee."172
B. Legislative Intent
In addition to plain meaning, courts have examined
legislative intent to determine whether IFP prisoner plaintiffs
may join under Rule 20(a)(1).171 Some courts contend that a per
se rule against joinder best aligns with Congress's intent in
enacting the PLRA and its IFP provisions. For example, in
Hubbard, the Eleventh Circuit held that, because "the
Congressional purpose in promulgating the PLRA" was to deter
frivolous prisoner litigation, IFP prisoner plaintiffs are
prohibited from joining under Rule 20(a)(1).' 7s To support this
view, the court first determined that Congress's general intent in
enacting the PLRA "was to curtail abusive prisoner tort, civil
rights and conditions of confinement litigation."176 The court
169 Hagan, 570 F.3d at 164 (Roth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
170 Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (2006)).
171 Hagan, 570 F.3d at 164 (Roth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
172 Id. at 165.
13 See infra Part IV.A.2.
174 See, e.g., Hubbard v. Haley, 262 F.3d 1194, 1197-98. (11th Cir. 2001);
Mackey v. Walker, No. CV 108-129, 2008 WL 4657879, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 21, 2008)
(stating that allowing joinder by IFP prisoners "would circumvent the Congressional
purpose in promulgating the PLRA"); Tyner v. Donald, No. CV 307-075, 2007 WL
4553052, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 19, 2007) (denying joinder based on Hubbard and
finding that "Plaintiffs' contention that Congress never intended for Plaintiffs
proceeding jointly . .. to pay separate filing fees is . . . without merit"); cf. Sundstrom
v. Frank, No. 06-C-0112, 2006 WL 2038204, at *2 (E.D. Wis. July 12, 2006)
(requiring separate filing fees but conceding that "[riequiring every prisoner
plaintiff. . . to pay the full filing fee might further the intent of Congress to curtail
prisoner litigation").
17. Hubbard, 262 F.3d at 1197-98.
17 Id. at 1196 (citing Anderson v. Singletary, 111 F.3d 801, 805 (11th Cir.
1997)).
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then cited the congressional record to show that Congress
enacted the statute's IFP provisions to further its intent to
"'deter frivolous inmate lawsuits.' ""' Finally, the court looked
to decisions from other circuits, which held that, given Congress's
intent "to taper prisoner litigation," the PLRA should be read as
requiring individual filing fees.1 8 Based on these findings, the
court determined that a per se rule prohibiting joinder best
supported the legislative intent behind the enactment of the
PLRA.179
Conversely, in Hagan, the Third Circuit asserted that
Congress intended for IFP prisoners to be permitted to join under
Rule 20(a)(1) if each litigant pays an individual filing fee.180 To
support this view, the Hagan court evaluated legislative intent
through the lens of plain meaning. Primarily, the court found
that neither the text of the PLRA nor its legislative history
demonstrate Congress's intent "to alter the plain language of
Rule 20" by prohibiting joinder by IFP prisoners plaintiffs.18 '
This statutory silence, the court reasoned, implies that Congress
did not intend for the PLRA to prohibit IFP prisoner plaintiffs
from joining in a single action.18 2 Moreover, when the Hagan
court turned to the PLRA's IFP provisions, it concluded that,
"Congress did not intend § 1915(b)(3) to be a vehicle for denying a
prisoner's access to permissive joinder."s8 3  Instead, the court
reasoned that the plain language of § 1915(b)(3), when read in
tandem with § 1915(b)(4),18 suggests that Congress "intended to
177 Id. at 1198 (quoting 141 CONG. REC. S7,526 (daily ed. May 25, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Kyl)).
17s Id. at 1196-97 (citing cases).
"' Id. at 1197-98. Essentially, Hubbard determined that Congress intended to
require individual filing fees, rather than a collective filing fee, because individual
filing fees would provide the most financial deterrence to frivolous prisoner filings.
Id. District courts that adopted this reasoning have also noted that a collective filing
fee may actually reduce the PLRA's effectiveness in deterring frivolous prisoner
litigation. See Ray v. Evercom Sys. Inc., No. 4:05-2904-RBH, 2006 WL 2475264, at
*6 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 2006) (citing Hubbard, 262 F.3d at 1198) (finding that a
collective filing fee "ignores the Congressional purpose in promulgating the PLRA"
and would "drastically reduce[]" the "monetary deterrence intended by the PLRA");
Lawson v. Sizemore, No. Civ.A. 05-CV-108-KKC, 2005 WL 1514310, at *1 n.1 (E.D.
Ky. June 24, 2005) (stating that a collective filing fee would "circumvent[ I" the
intent of the PLRA).
18. Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 155-56 (3d Cir. 2009).
1 Id. at 152.
182 Id. at 156 n.3.
Id. at 155 (emphasis omitted); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (2006).
184 § 1915(b)(4).
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protect ... IFP prisoner[s'] rights" by ensuring that the statute's
fee scheme would not impede prisoners' access to the courts.'
Thus, the court held that, since Congress did not design
§ 1915(b)(3) "to serve as a bar to the collection of multiple
individual fees from individual plaintiffs in a joint litigation," IFP
prisoner plaintiffs could join under Rule 20(a)(1) if each litigant
paid an individual filing fee.se
C. Implied Repeals Analysis
A few courts have used the implied repeals analysis to
reconcile the PLRA with Rule 20(a)(1)."' The Supreme Court
has never established the appropriate method for analyzing
conflicts between federal statutes and federal rules. 18  The
implied repeals analysis is typically applied to statute-to-statute
conflicts' 8 9 but courts often borrow this test to resolve clashes
between statutes and Rules.190 Accordingly, in two cases, the
Supreme Court has used the implied repeals analysis to settle
statute-rule conflicts. 191
In the context of a statute-rule conflict, the implied repeals
analysis requires a two-part inquiry.192  First, courts must
determine if there is an "irreconcilable conflict" between the
statute and the rule.193 Repeals by implication are generally
185 Hagan, 570 F.3d at 156 n.3 (emphasis omitted).
186 Id. at 155-56.
187 See infra Part III.C.
"s Bernadette Bollas Genetin, Expressly Repudiating Implied Repeals Analysis:
A New Framework for Resolving Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and
Federal Rules, 51 EMORY L.J. 677, 705 (2002).
18' See id. at 680 (finding that the implied repeals analysis was developed to
resolve conflicts between two statutes).
190 Id. at 701 ("Courts have come to rely on the framework of... implied repeals
when resolving apparent conflicts between statutes and Federal Rules . . . .").
"' See, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 656 (1996) (finding that
the question presented was whether the Suits in Admiralty Act's "forthwith"
instruction for service of process "has been superseded" by Federal Rule 4(j));
Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987) (using implied
repeals to resolve a conflict between Rule 54(d) and two portions of congressional
statutes that provided for taxation of court costs).
192 See Genetin, supra note 188, at 704; see also Radzanower v. Touche Ross &
Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976) (quoting Posadas v. Nat'l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503
(1936)) (finding that there are "'two well-settled categories of repeals by
implication' ").
13 See Genetin, supra note 188, at 704 ("In resolving clashes between statutes
and Federal Rules ... courts have held that the first line of inquiry is whether there
is an irreconcilable conflict. . . ."); see also Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003)
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disfavored.'94 Thus, in addressing this threshold question, many
courts have held that courts should favor a harmonizing
construction that permits the statute and the rule to coexist.'9 5
Under the second prong of the analysis, a court must determine if
there is a clear congressional intent for one provision to repeal
the other. 9 6  Where courts find that a statute-rule conflict
satisfies either prong of this analysis, they generally hold that
the later enacted statute or rule "controls and supersedes the
former to the extent of the actual conflict."
Though the implied repeals analysis has not been the
centerpiece of courts' approach to PLRA-Rule 20(a)(1) cases, a
few courts have invoked implied repeals within the context of
plain meaning and legislative intent. 9 8  The Eleventh Circuit
was the first court to use implied repeals to support a per se rule
against joinder.19 9 In Hubbard, the court held that the PLRA
repealed Rule 20(a)(1) as it applies to IFP prisoner plaintiffs.20 0
Notably, Hubbard did not expressly state that the PLRA and
Rule 20 were in "irreconcilable conflict." The court inferred,
(using the "irreconcilable conflict" standard to analyze statute-to-statute conflict);
Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 155 (same).
14 Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 154 (quoting United States v. United Cont'l Tuna
Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 168 (1976)) (finding that it is "'a cardinal principle of statutory
construction that repeals by implication are not favored' ").
1' Genetin, supra note 188, at 704 (citing Crawford Fitting, 482 U.S. at 442,
445).
16 See, e.g., Henderson, 517 U.S. at 672; Crawford Fitting, 482 U.S. at 445.
117 Genetin, supra note 188, at 705 & n.135 (citing cases); see Henderson, 517
U.S. at 672 (stating that later rule repeals conflicting statute); see also Nat'l Ass'n of
Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 646 (2007) (intention of the
legislature to repeal must be "clear and manifest"); Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 155
(finding that where there is an implied repeal, later statute controls only to the
"minimum extent necessary" to resolve the conflict).
198 See Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 152, 156 (3d. Cir. 2009); Boriboune v.
Berge, 391 F.3d 852, 854 (7th Cir. 2004); Hubbard v. Haley, 262 F.3d 1194, 1198
(11th Cir. 2001).
199 Hubbard, 262 F.3d at 1198. Unlike plain meaning, legislative intent, and
public policy arguments, implied repeals has not been as readily adopted by district
courts supporting the per se rule. Thus, only a few have applied this rationale. See,
e.g., Hershberger v. Evercom Inc., No. 07-3152-SAC, 2008 WL 45693, at *1 (D. Kan.
Jan. 2, 2008) (adopting Hubbard's implied repeals analysis); Naasz v. Dretke, No.
2:05-CV-0137, 2005 WL 1249439, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 26, 2005) (citing Hubbard to
determine that PLRA repealed Rule 20, and "therefore, requires a separate action
and payment of full filing fee by each prisoner"); cf Daker v. Ferrero, No. Civ.A.
1:03-CV-02481, 2007 WL 1100463, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2007) (applying Hubbard's
implied repeals analysis to a conflict between Rule 24 and the PLRA).
20 Hubbard, 262 F.3d at 1198.
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however, that Rule 20 conflicted with the PLRA because the
plain meaning of § 1915(b)(1) requires IFP prisoners to pay full
individual filing fees.2 01 To the court in Hubbard, this conflict
was sufficient to warrant an implied repeal. Thus, the court held
that "to the extent that . . . Rule 20 ... actually conflicts with the
PLRA ... the statute repeals the Rule."202
Alternatively, in Boriboune and Hagan, the Seventh and
Third Circuits used the implied repeals analysis tc support
joinder by IFP prisoner plaintiffs who pay individual filing
fees.203 Specifically, these courts contended that the PLRA did
not impliedly repeal Rule 20 as it applies to IFP prisoner
plaintiffs.20 4 Boriboune and Hagan advanced three rationales to
support this conclusion. First, the courts asserted that there is
no express conflict between the text of the PLRA and the text of
Rule 20 that would warrant repeal by implication.2 05 Without an
express reference to permissive joinder in the PLRA, the courts
concluded that the statute could not have repealed Rule 20
"unless the two provisions are in irreconcilable conflict.""
Second, Boriboune and Hagan reasoned that the PLRA and
Rule 20 do not meet the threshold "irreconcilable conflict"
standard of the implied repeals analysis.20 7 In Boriboune, the
court held that an irreconcilable conflict only occurs "when the
newer rule is logically incompatible with the older one."20 8 Any
conflict between the PLRA and Rule 20, the court reasoned, falls
201 Id.
20 Id. This finding, the court concluded, also coincided with Eleventh Circuit
precedent, which held that "[a] statute passed after the effective date of a federal
rule repeals the rule to the extent that it actually conflicts." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1489 (11th Cir. 1997)).
20 See Hagan, 570 F.3d at 152, 156; Boriboune, 391 F.3d at 855.
20 See infra notes 205-17 and accompanying text. Only a handful of district
courts have applied these courts' analysis to determine that the PLRA did not repeal
Rule 20 by implication. See, e.g., Johnson-Bey v. Ind. Dep't of Corr., No. 3:09-CV-249,
2009 WL 1691150, at *1 (N.D. Ind. June 16, 2009); Wasko v. Allen Cnty. Jail, No.
1:06-CV-085 TLS, 2006 WL 978956, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 12, 2006).
20' Hagan, 570 F.3d at 154 (finding that "[t]he PLRA did not alter the text of
Rule 20, or make any reference to the Rule"); Boriboune, 391 F.3d at 854 (noting
that, unlike other federal rules that expressly "forbid joinder in prisoners' collateral
attacks on their convictions," neither Rule 20 nor the PLRA contain comparable
prohibitions against joinder).
20 Hagan, 570 F.3d at 155.
207 See Boriboune, 391 F.3d at 854 ("[Tlhere is no irreconcilable conflict between
Rule 20 and the PLRA . . . .").
20 Id. (citing Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003)).
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short of this standard.2 09 Accordingly, the court concluded that,
because the PLRA and Rule 20 do not irreconcilably conflict, the
statute and the Rule can coexist."2 10 This could be achieved, the
Boriboune court concluded, if courts take "§ 1915(b)(1) at face
value" and require each IFP prisoner in a joint action to pay the
full individual fee.2 1' The Hagan court agreed, adding that
"[s]uch an interpretation can also be read in harmony with§ 1915(b)(3)."2 12
Finally, Boriboune and Hagan determined that there was no
clear intent by Congress for the PLRA to repeal Rule 20. In
Hagan, the court found that, without an irreconcilable conflict
between the statute and Rule 20, or a "'clear and manifest'
intent by Congress to repeal Rule 20," there was no repeal by
implication.23  Hagan also warned that allowing the PLRA to
repeal Rule 20 by implication could have negative policy
effects.2 14 Primarily, the court noted that, in the PLRA-Rule 20
context, repeal by implication "would undermine congressional
goals" to allow joinder by IFP prisoners.2 1 5 Moreover, in a
broader sense, finding an implied repeal where there is no
irreconcilable conflict or congressional intent to repeal would
"expand repeal by implication" from a limited-use doctrine "into
an everyday principle."2 16  This could have far-reaching
consequences, the court reasoned, "since Congress routinely
enacts legislation with provisions that do not neatly coexist with
existing statutes."217
209 Id. (asserting that district court's public policy arguments against joinder do
not create an irreconcilable conflict between the PLRA and Rule 20).
210 Id.; see also Hagan, 570 F.3d at 156 ("The two laws at issue .. . can and
should coexist.").
211 Boriboune, 391 F.3d at 856; see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (2006).
212 Hagan, 570 F.3d at 155 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Boriboune, 391 F.3d at 856); see § 1915(b)(3). Moreover, both the Boriboune and
Hagan courts reasoned that the PLRA's "three strikes" provision harmonizes with
Rule 20 if courts hold.that all IFP prisoners in a joint action are accountable for
strikes levied against the joint claim. Hagan, 570 F.3d at 156; Boriboune, 391 F.3d
at 855; see infra notes 240-44 and accompanying text.
212 Hagan, 570 F.3d at 156.
214 See id.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id.
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D. Public Policy Arguments
Courts on all sides of the PLRA-Rule 20(a)(1) debate have
advanced public policy arguments to support their approach to
joinder by IFP prisoners.21 8 Primarily, many district courts that
adopted a per se rule against joinder have asserted that, because
joinder by IFP prisoners creates practical and administrative
difficulties, these plaintiffs may not join in a single action.2 19 To
support this view, the district courts focused on four policy
concerns. First, courts contended that requiring a collective
filing fee for joinder would not only weaken the PLRA's financial
deterrence and encourage prisoners to file frivolous claims,2 20 but
it would also create an administrative headache for courts that
must apportion one fee to multiple prisoners.22 1
Second, courts reasoned that allowing joinder complicates
the assessment of strikes under § 1915(g) of the PLRA, and may
even allow prisoners to avoid strikes if a complaint is not
dismissed in its entirety.2 22 Section 1915(g) requires courts to
impose a strike when a prisoner brings "an action or appeal" that
is "dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted."2 23
Generally, district courts have interpreted this language as
requiring courts to assess a strike "only if the entire action is
dismissed."2 24 Joinder, courts averred, confuses matters in IFP
218 See infra Part III.D. Only the Sixth Circuit has used public policy arguments
to advocate for joinder with collective filing fee. In In re Prison Litigation Reform
Act, 105 F.3d 1131 (6th Cir. 1997), the court pointed to the administrative benefits of
permitting a collective fee, finding that this payment scheme would "permit easier
accounting for the district courts and prison officials." Id. at 1138-39. The court also
considered fairness as a factor in its decision, noting that "[b]ecause each prisoner
chose to join in the prosecution of the case, each prisoner should be proportionally
liable for any fees and costs that may be assessed." Id. at 1137-38.
219 See, e.g., Williams v. Hebbon, No. 09-2103 (AET), 2009 WL 1323636, at *2
(D.N.J. May 8, 2009) (finding "that the impracticalities inherent in multiple-prisoner
litigation militate against the permissive joinder allowed by Rule 20").
220 See, e.g., Ray v. Evercom Sys. Inc., No. 4:05-2904-RBH, 2006 WL 2475264, at
*6 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 2006).
221 See, e.g., Lawson v. Sizemore, No. Civ.A. 05-CV-108-KKC, 2005 WL 1514310,
at *1, n.1 (E.D. Ky. June 24, 2005); Boriboune v. Berge, No. 04-C-15-C, 2004 WL
231156, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 2, 2004).
222 See, e.g., Jones v. Abby, No. 4:09CV1089 AGF, 2009 WL 2169894, at *1 (E.D.
Mo. July 17, 2009); Eickleberry v. Lappin, No. 09-1556 (NLH), 2009 WL 961399, at
*2 (D.N.J. Apr. 8, 2009); Swenson v. MacDonald, No. CV 05-93-GF-CSO, 2006 WL
240233, at *2 (D. Mont. Jan. 30, 2006).
223 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2006).
224 Jones, 2009 WL 2169894, at *1.
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actions where "some but not all of the claims are frivolous or
dismissed."225 Moreover, in this scenario, a prisoner whose
frivolous claim is dismissed may actually avoid a strike under
§ 1915(g) "if his claims are joined with others that may be
meritorious."2 26 Thus, courts contended that, by limiting a
frivolous claimant's exposure under § 1915(g), joinder would
encourage inmates to file frivolous claims.22 7
Third, courts asserted that prisoners permitted to join in a
single action will behave improperly when pursuing their
claims.2 2 Particularly, prisoners may coerce each other into suits
for the sake of saving on the costs of litigation or avoiding strikes
under § 1915(g). 229  Furthermore, courts have contended that
prisoners in a joint action may change legal documents as they
are circulated among the parties.23 0 To that end, the district
judge in Boriboune v. Berge warned that allowing joinder would
encourage "[jailhouse 'lawyers'" to "forge others' signatures" on
legal documents, or "otherwise attempt to act on behalf of their
fellow plaintiffs."3 1
Fourth, courts maintained that the circumstances of
incarceration make managing joint IFP litigation "exceptionally
difficult."2 32 In Swenson, for example, the district court found
that the "practical difficulties" of managing litigation among
plaintiffs "who have no guarantee that they will all remain at the
same prison or in the same area of a prison while they are
litigating together" were too great.23 3 The District Court for the
225 Boriboune v. Berge, 391 F.3d 852, 854 (7th Cir. 2004) (recognizing district
courts' concerns that, in this scenario, it would be "hard to know which plaintiffs
should be assessed 'strikes' under § 1915(g)").
226 Swenson, 2006 WL 240233, at *3. In other words, "[a] pro se prisoner-plaintiff
litigating alone receives a strike if he earns it; the same plaintiff litigating jointly
might avoid a strike because someone else did not earn it." Id. (emphasis omitted).
227 See cases cited supra notes 221-22.
228 See cases cited supra notes 221-22.
229 See, e.g., Beaird v. Lappin, No. 3:06-CV-0967-L, 2006 WL 2051034, at *4
(N.D. Tex. July 24, 2006) (finding that joinder increases the possibility of coercion
among prisoners); Swenson, 2006 WL 240233, at *4 (noting that "coercion, subtle or
not, frequently plays a role in relations between inmates").
230 See, e.g., Beaird, 2006 WL 2051034, at *4; see also cases cited supra notes
221-22.
231 Boriboune v. Berge, 391 F.3d 852, 854 (7th Cir. 2004) (explaining the judge's
reasoning for denying joinder).
232 Williams v. Hebbon, No. 09-2103 (AET), 2009 WL 1323636, at *3 (D.N.J. May
8, 2009).
233 Swenson, 2006 WL 240233, at *3.
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Northern District of Indiana agreed in Wasko v. Allen County
Jail, reasoning that, because "jail populations are notably
transitory," obtaining signatures and completing service of
process for every co-plaintiff in a joint action was unfeasible.2 3 4
District courts have also contended that allowing joinder by IFP
prisoners could raise security concerns if prisoners "seek to
compel prison authorities to permit them to gather to discuss the
joint litigation."3
Conversely, Boriboune and Hagan used policy arguments to
support allowing joinder with individual filing fees.236 These
courts primarily countered district courts' four arguments
against joinder. First, they contended that the concerns
implicated by a collective filing fee "vanish" if courts require
prisoners to pay individual fees for joinder.2 37 To that end, the
court in Boriboune found that, unlike a collective fee scheme,
requiring prisoners to pay individual fees would not "undermine
the system of financial incentives created by the PLRA" but
would instead help deter prisoners from filing frivolous
lawsuits.23 8 Moreover, from a judicial administration perspective,
Boriboune contended that it would be easier for courts to assess
an individual filing fee than "attempt to apportion one fee among
multiple prisoners whose litigation histories and trust balances
differ."239
Second, these courts contended that allowing joinder would
not permit IFP prisoner plaintiffs to avoid strikes under
§ 1915(g).2 40 In Boriboune, the court found that the text of
§ 1915(g) does not limit courts' assessments of strikes to actions
that are dismissed entirely.2 4' Instead, the court held that
234 Wasko v. Allen Cnty. Jail, No. 1:06-CV-085 TLS, 2006 WL 978956, at *1
(N.D. Ind., Apr. 12, 2006).
235 Williams, 2009 WL 1323636, at *2; Beaird, 2006 WL 2051034, at *4; see also
Wasko, 2006 WL 978956, at *1.
236 See Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 156 (3d Cir. 2009); Boriboune, 391 F.3d at
855-56.
237 Boriboune, 391 F.3d at 856.
23" Id. at 854-55. The courts reasoned that, if lower courts inform prisoners
about the requirement of a full fee, as well as the risk that they will be held
accountable for their co-plaintiffs' claims under § 1915(g), see infra notes 240-44 and
accompanying text, "many prisoners will opt to litigate by themselves." Boriboune,
391 F.3d at 856. This process would, ideally, "simplify litigation ... without any
insult to Rule 20." Id.
239 Boriboune, 391 F.3d at 856.
240 See Hagan, 570 F.3d at 156; Boriboune, 391 F.3d at 855.
241 Boriboune, 391 F.3d at 855.
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§ 1915(g) requires courts to assess strikes to all plaintiffs in a
joint action "when any claim in a complaint or appeal is
'frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.' "242 Under this approach, when a court
dismisses some of the claims in a joint complaint or appeal, each
IFP prisoner would incur a strike, even if the claims did not
concern him or her personally.2 43 This interpretation, the
Boriboune court reasoned, makes it easier for courts to assess
strikes in IFP actions and "creates countervailing costs" to joint
litigation that will dissuade prisoners from filing frivolous
lawsuits.244
Third, Boriboune and Hagan held that district courts could
not deny joinder based on generalized concerns about inmate
behavior or circumstances of incarceration. In Boriboune, the
court found that the policy concerns cited by the district court,
such as the proliferation of jailhouse lawyers, were "unrelated to
the PLRA" and could not be adequately addressed simply by
applying a per se rule against joinder. 4 6 The court noted that
civil cases were "complex whether or not any plaintiff is a
prisoner" and that jailhouse lawyers had "surely overstepped
their roles on occasion before the PLRA, and they may do so even
if multiple prisoners prepay all fees" to join in a non-IFP
action.2 46 Consequently, the court held that these policy concerns
were not adequate grounds for denying joinder as a matter of
law.247
242 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)).
243 Id.; see Hagan, 570 F.3d at 156 (finding that, though the question of how
strikes should be assessed in joint IFP actions was not before the court, a joint IFP
litigant would not necessarily be permitted to avoid a strike under § 1915(g)).
2" Boriboune, 391 F.3d at 854. After Boriboune, the Seventh Circuit re-affirmed
the notion that strikes should be assessed on a per-claim, not a per-action, basis in
George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607-08 (7th Cir. 2007). There, the court held that
when an IFP prisoner files "a multi-claim, multi-defendant suit, the district court
should evaluate each claim for the purpose of § 1915(g)." Id. at 607. Thus, in light of
both Boriboune and George, district courts have interpreted the law in the Seventh
Circuit as requiring district courts to issue § 1915(g) strikes for each of the "legally
meritless claims within an action." Johnson v. Justus, No. 09-cv-433-GPM, 2009 WL
1971640, at *2 (S.D. Ill. July 8, 2009).
245 Boriboune, 391 F.3d at 854.
246 Id.
247 Id. at 854-55.
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Similarly, the majority in Hagan contended that district
courts could not deny joinder based on "general assumptions
regarding the circumstances of incarceration."24 8 The court held
that the district court abused its discretion when it prohibited
joinder by IFP prisoners based on general concerns about prison
conditions that were identified by other courts, without applying
those considerations to the Plaintiffs' case.2 49 According to the
Hagan majority, district courts were still free under Rule 20's
broad discretion to deny joinder of IFP prisoners, so long as they
did so based on the facts of each case.25 0 Thus, the court held
that conditions of incarceration could be a plausible basis for
denying joinder where a court "provide[s] a reasoned analysis
that comports with the requirements of the Rule, and that is
based on the specific fact pattern presented by the plaintiffs and
claims before the court."2 5 1
E. Jones v. Bock
While the Supreme Court has not determined whether IFP
prisoners may join as plaintiffs under Rule 20(a)(1), in Jones v.
Bock the Court used the same four interpretive tools to resolve
a procedural clash between the PLRA and Rule 8(a).2 52
Accordingly, although Jones does not address the issue of joinder
by IFP prisoners, this decision may be predictive both of the
approach the Court would take in a PLRA-Rule 20(a)(1) case and,
ultimately, how it would likely resolve this conflict between the
statute and the Rule.
In Jones, the Court considered whether prisoners were
required to plead that they had exhausted their administrative
remedies under the PLRA.2 53 Section 1997e254 of the PLRA does
not specify a pleading requirement for exhaustion; 2 5 5 meanwhile,
248 Hagan, 570 F.3d at 157. But see id. at 163 (Jordan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that the district court's "denial of joinder was
sufficiently tied to the present particulars that [the court] should recognize the
decision as fairly disposing of the case on its facts").
249 Id. at 157 (majority opinion) (finding that the district court relied on
"extrinsic considerations" rather than determining whether plaintiffs satisfied the
criteria for permissive joinder under Rule 20).
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211-14 (2007).
253 Id. at 204-05.
'" 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2006).
2 Id. at 211-12; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2006).
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the usual practice under Rule 8(a) is to regard exhaustion as an
affirmative defense.25 6 The Court found that, except where the
PLRA specifies a different procedural requirement, courts
interpreting the Act should follow the usual practice under the
Federal Rules .25  Accordingly, the Court held that exhaustion is
an affirmative defense under the PLRA, and that the Sixth
Circuit had exceeded its judicial authority by requiring prisoners
to plead exhaustion in their complaints.25 8
The Supreme Court applied the same four interpretative
tools to support its holding in Jones. As in many of the PLRA-
Rule 20(a)(1) cases, the Jones Court relied on plain meaning as
its dominant rationale. It determined that, when Congress
intended to override the Federal Rules with its own procedural
requirements, it usually did so "expressly" in the text of the
PLRA.2 5 9 Thus, the Court examined the plain meaning of the
text of § 1997e, finding that the provision did not enumerate any
special procedural requirements for exhaustion. 2 60 This absence
of an express requirement, the Court contended, was "strong
evidence that the usual practice" under Rule 8(a) should
control.2"' Similarly, the Court found that the plain language of
the PLRA did not impliedly alter the normal pleading rules for
exhaustion.6 2 To that end, the Court disagreed with the Sixth
Circuit that the PLRA "implicitly" justified deviating from Rule
8(a) simply because this practice would make it easier for courts
to screen prisoner complaints under § 1915A.2 63
Second, the Court considered the legislative intent behind
the plain meaning of § 1997e. The Court noted that Congress did
not intend for § 1997e to create a different pleading requirement
than that required under Rule 8(a) because, unlike other
provisions of the PLRA, the language of the statute did not
expressly reference any intent to depart from the usual practice
256 Jones, 549 U.S. at 212; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
257 Jones, 549 U.S. at 216-17.
258 See id. at 216.
259 Id.
260 Id. at 214.
261 Id. at 212 (finding that, although "[tihe PLRA dealt extensively with the
subject of exhaustion," the Act was "silent on the issue whether exhaustion must be
pleaded by the plaintiff").
262 Id. at 215.
26 Id. at 215-16; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (2006).
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under the Federal Rules.264 Moreover, the Court acknowledged
that exhaustion was a "'centerpiece'" of the PLRA's effort to
reduce the quantity of prisoner suits.26 5 However, the Court did
not comb the congressional record for evidence of Congress's
intent to create a pleading requirement in § 1997e.**
Third, the Jones decision was consistent with the implied
repeals analysis, although the Court did not expressly invoke
that doctrine. Following the threshold "irreconcilable conflict"
prong of the implied repeals analysis, the Court harmonized
the statute and Rule 8(a), holding that, while exhaustion is still
"mandatory under the PLRA," failure to exhaust was an
affirmative defense governed by Rule 8(a).268 Then, in accord
with the "clear intent" requirement,26 9 the Court found that
Congress needed to indicate "expressly" that it "meant to depart
from the usual procedural requirements" under Rule 8(a) in order
to exempt the PLRA from operation under that Rule. 27 0 Thus,
even without referencing the implied repeals analysis, the Court
demonstrated that repeal by implication was not appropriate in
the Jones case.
Fourth, the Court used public policy arguments to support
its holding in Jones. To begin, the Court observed that "[clourts
should generally not depart from the usual practice under the
Federal Rules on the basis of perceived policy concerns."271
Accordingly, the Court held that the policy concerns raised in
favor of imposing a pleading requirement for exhaustion, such as
courts' need to efficiently screen prisoner complaints, could not
serve as the sole basis for deviating from the usual practice
under Rule 8(a).272 Even if the concerns supporting a pleading
requirement were valid, the Court reasoned, they could not
"fairly be viewed as an interpretation of the PLRA."27 3
Consequently, the Court determined that a pleading requirement
2 Jones, 549 U.S. at 214-16.
265 Id. at 214 (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006)).
26 Accordingly, Justice Roberts never cited to the Congressional Record to
support the Court's propositions in the Jones opinion.
267 See supra Part III.C.
26 Jones, 549 U.S. at 211.
269 See supra Part III.C.
270 Jones, 549 U.S. at 216.
271 Id. at 212.
272 See id. at 212-13.
271 Id. at 216.
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for exhaustion could only "be obtained by the process of
amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial
interpretation."274
By analogy, Jones demonstrates both how the Supreme
Court may approach a PLRA-Rule 20(a) case and how it would
likely come out on the issue of joinder by IFP prisoner plaintiffs.
Given that the Court used the same four interpretive tools to
resolve the procedural conflict in Jones as lower courts have used
in PLRA-Rule 20(a)(1) cases, it seems likely that the Court would
apply this approach if asked to determine whether IFP prisoners
may join as plaintiffs under Rule 20(a)(1). Furthermore,
although Jones concerned a procedural clash between the PLRA
and a different Federal Rule, the rationales the Court applied to
resolve that case are dispositive in the PLRA-Rule 20(a)(1)
context. Essentially, the Court determined in Jones that, in the
absence of express direction from the PLRA, courts should not
interpret the statute as imposing procedural requirements that
conflict with the Federal Rules.2 75 In light of this holding, the
Court would likely find that the "usual practice" under Rule
20(a)(1) should control and courts should allow IFP prisoners to
join as plaintiffs.2 76 Like § 1997e, § 1915 of the PLRA does not
enumerate any procedural requirements related to joinder, or
otherwise "explicitly" prohibit joint actions by IFP prisoners.2 7
This is "strong evidence" that Rule 20(a)(1) should control in IFP
prison litigation.7 Moreover, § 1915 does not implicitly prohibit
joinder by IFP prisoners. Jones makes clear that a statutory
inference of a procedural requirement must be reasonably
obvious to justify diverging from a Federal Rule. 2 79 Thus, the
Court would likely find that PLRA's filing fee provisions do not
meet this standard. 280  Finally, in the absence of express or
implied guidance from the PLRA, the Court would probably find
that the policy concerns raised by joinder cannot provide the
basis for impinging on Rule 20's typically broad standards for
274 Id. at 213 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Leatherman v.
Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)).
275 Id. at 212.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 214; see 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2006).
278 Jones, 549 U.S. at 212.
279 See id. at 214.
280 See supra Part III.A.1.
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permissive joinder.281 Therefore, the Court would ultimately hold
that, unless it amends Rule 20 to prohibit joinder by IFP
prisoners, courts cannot use "judicial interpretation" to
categorically deny these plaintiffs' their right to join in a single
action. 282
IV. RESOLVING THE PLRA-RULE 20(A)(1) CONFLICT
As evidenced in Part III, circuit and district courts remain
divided over the issue of joinder by IFP prisoner plaintiffs.28 3
Further, although the Supreme Court has resolved other clashes
between the PLRA and the Federal Rules, it has not specifically
addressed this procedural issue.2 84 Part IV explores how to
resolve the PLRA-Rule 20(a)(1) conflict. Part IV.A contends that,
of the outcomes reached by courts in PLRA-Rule 20(a)(1) cases,
the better result is to allow IFP prisoners to join as plaintiffs and
pay a collective filing fee. 28 5 This Part uses both the four
interpretative tools and the Supreme Court's reasoning in Jones
to support this rationale.2 86  Finally, Part IV.B avers that the
Supreme Court should resolve the PLRA-Rule 20(a)(1) conflict by
determining whether IFP prisoners may join in a single action.287
A. Courts Should Permit IFP Prisoners To Join with a
Collective Filing Fee
Of the three outcomes reached by courts in PLRA-Rule
20(a)(1) cases, the better result is to allow IFP prisoner plaintiffs
to join under Rule 20(a)(1) and pay a collective filing fee. This
view is supported by courts' four tools of interpretation and the
Supreme Court's analysis in Jones.288 Thus, until the Supreme
Court rules on the PLRA-Rule 20(a)(1) issue or Congress amends
the PLRA, courts who are asked to decide whether IFP prisoners
may join in a single action should follow this view.
281 See Jones, 549 U.S. at 212.
2 Id. at 212-13. (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)).
28 See supra Part III.
28 See supra Part III.E.
28 See infra Part IV.A.
28 See infra Part IV.A.
287 See infra Part IV.B.
2" See infra Part IV.A.
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1. Plain Meaning
Primarily, the plain meaning of the PLRA and Rule 20(a)(1)
demonstrate that IFP prisoners may join under Rule 20(a)(1) and
pay a collective filing fee. As discussed in Boriboune and Hagan,
the text of PLRA does not even mention Rule 20 joinder."'
Similarly, the text of Rule 20 does not address the availability of
joinder by IFP prisoners; it states only that "persons" may join in
a single action when the criteria for permissive joinder are met. 2 9 0
In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, the Supreme Court held that
courts should define "persons" permitted to join under Rule 20 in
"the broadest possible scope" that is still "consistent with fairness
to the parties."2 9' In applying this standard to IFP prison
litigation, courts may deny joinder in cases where doing so would
best comport with notions of fairness.292 However, as a general
matter, the plain language of Rule 20 indicates that IFP
prisoners should "be included within the broad definition of
persons capable of joining their claim pursuant to ... Rule
[201.
Furthermore, the plain meaning of the PLRA does not
implicitly prohibit joinder by IFP prisoners. Hubbard and
supporting courts have asserted that § 1915(b)(1)'s individual
filing fee requirement impliedly bars joinder.2 9 ' However, in light
of Jones, courts should find that, because § 1915(b)(1) does not
concern joinder or a related procedural issue, this provision
cannot implicitly prohibit joinder or provide justification for
deviating from usual practice under Rule 20(a)(1). 295 The issue of
whether § 1915(b)(1) implicitly bars joinder vanishes if courts
simply hold that the plain meaning of that provision requires IFP
prisoners to pay a collective filing fee. Indeed, as Judge Roth
argued in Hagan, § 1915(b)(1) should not be read as requiring
each prisoner to pay the full amount of the filing fee-that is, the
full individual fee-but instead as requiring each prisoner to pay
"the full amount of a filing fee"-that is, a portion of the full
289 See supra Part III.A.2.
290 FED R. Civ. P. 20.
291 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966).
292 See supra Part I.
293 Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 157 (3d Cir. 2009).
294 See supra Part III.A.1.
295 See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 214 (2007).
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individual fee.296 This interpretation coincides with a plain
reading of § 1915(b)(3), which limits the total filing fee the court
may collect for an IFP action or appeal.29 Accordingly, reading
these two provisions together, each IFP prisoner should be
required to pay an apportioned amount of a filing fee, while the
total filing fee collected for the joint action or appeal cannot
exceed the statutory limit.2 98
2. Legislative Intent
Resort to legislative intent may not be necessary or advisable
in the PLRA-Rule 20(a)(1) context. Commentators have noted
that, in recent years, the Supreme Court's "emphasis in statutory
interpretation has shifted away from the divination of legislative
intent and toward the parsing of the statutory text's ordinary
meaning."29 This trend was evident in Jones: While the Court
acknowledged that exhaustion was a "'centerpiece'" of the
PLRA's effort to reduce the quantity of prisoner suits, 30 0 it did not
search the congressional record for evidence of Congress's intent
to create a pleading requirement in § 1997e. Instead, the Court
looked primarily at the plain language of the PLRA.ao'
Similarly, in the PLRA-Rule 20(a)(1) context, legislative
intent is not a useful interpretive tool. While one can argue that
the plain language of the PLRA is far from plain,3 02 based on the
Supreme Court's partiality to plain meaning,3 03 courts should rely
on the statutory text over legislative intent. Moreover, though
the PLRA's legislative history evidences Congress's general
desire to deter frivolous litigation,3 04 like the PLRA itself, it does
not address joinder by IFP prisoner plaintiffs. Accordingly,
courts that rely on Congress's general legislative intent as their
296 See supra Part III.A.3; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
.. See § 1915(b)(3) (2006).
298 § 1915(b)(1), (3).
299 MAMMEN, supra note 115, at 26.
" Jones, 549 U.S. at 214 (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006)).
301 See supra Part III.E.
302 Compare supra Part III.A.1, with Part III.A.2, and Part III.A.3 (comparing
courts' varying approaches to anaylzing and applying the plain meaning of the
PLRA and Rule 20 in IFP prisoner cases).
303 See Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 157 (3d Cir. 2009).
3 See supra Part II.
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basis for denying joinder have, essentially, deviated from the
Federal Rules because of "perceived policy concerns," a result the
Supreme Court warned against in Jones.os
However, if courts analyze legislative intent, they should
construe it as permitting joinder by IFP prisoners with a
collective filing fee. Like the plain meaning of the text, the
PLRA's legislative history is silent on the issue of joinder, and
therefore cannot act as a bar to joinder by IFP prisoner plaintiffs.
Correspondingly, it is unclear from the legislative history
whether Congress intended IFP prisoners to pay individual fees
or a collective fee to file a joint complaint or appeal. Many courts
contend that, because the PLRA's broader purpose is to curtail
prisoner litigation, Congress intended joined prisoners to pay
individual filing fees.3 06  This reasoning is unpersuasive,
however. For one, it is yet unclear whether the PLRA's
mandatory filing fee actual deters prisoners from filing frivolous
claims.3 07 In theory, however, a collective fee effectuates this
goal. Though a collective fee would erect a lower financial hurdle
than a full individual fee, it still creates an "economic
disincentive" to frivolous litigation.os Moreover, courts will offset
any loss of financial deterrence if, like the Seventh Circuit, they
assess § 1915(g) strikes to all IFP prisoners when any claim in
their joint complaint or appeal is dismissed.o9 Similarly, in
addition to strikes, courts should hold that joint IFP prisoners
are collectively accountable for the revocation of good-time
credits when any claim is dismissed as frivolous or malicious.axo
This final measure of deterrence ensures that a rule allowing
joinder with collective filing fees will effectuate Congress's
legislative intent.
305 Jones, 549 U.S. at 212.
3o6 See supra Part III.B.
30' See Cordisco, supra note 70, at 26 (finding that before the enactment of the
PLRA, some courts decided not require partial filing fees for IFP actions because
"review of data from courts with partial fee plans indicated that no significant
decrease in the number of filings had occurred as a result of imposing the fees").
30s See 141 CONG. REC. 26,548 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
" See Boriboune v. Berge, 391 F.3d 852, 854-55 (7th Cir. 2004).
310 See 28 U.S.C. § 1932 (2006).
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3. Implied Repeals
Furthermore, the PLRA should not be construed as repealing
Rule 20 by implication. Indeed, as both the Ninth and Seventh
Circuit contended, this statute-rule conflict does not satisfy
either prong of the implied repeals analysis.3 1' First, there is no
"irreconcilable conflict" between the PLRA and Rule 20: The
statute and the rule can co-exist if courts both assess a collective
filing fee and levy § 1915(g) strikes against each IFP prisoner
that joins in an action or appeal.3 12 Second, Congress has not
expressed a clear intent for the PLRA to repeal Rule 20. Thus, in
absence of either an irreconcilable conflict or a clear intent to
repeal, both the PLRA and Rule 20 should be allowed to survive.
Finally, as the majority in Hagan noted, finding an implied
repeal here could have serious policy implications.1 3 Repeal by
implication is a last-resort measure that should be avoided where
reconciliation of the statute and rule is possible.3 14  Thus,
allowing the PLRA to repeal Rule 20 would stretch this doctrine
so far that, in future cases, courts could find any Rule that
marginally conflicts with a more recently-enacted statute should
be repealed by implication. Accordingly, courts should avoid this
result by permitting IFP prisoner plaintiffs to join under Rule
20(a)(1).
4. Public Policy Arguments
Allowing joinder with a collective filing fee is supported by
public policy rationales. In Jones, the Court found that policy
concerns alone could not serve as the basis for deviating from the
usual practice under the Federal Rules, even if those concerns
were valid.3"This rationale applies in force to the PLRA-Rule
20(a)(1) context. Here, district courts raised a number of valid
concerns about joinder-particularly, the difficulties of managing
joint actions where inmates are not guaranteed to remain in the
same prison or behave properly in pursing their claims.3 1 ' As
reasonable as these concerns may be, however, under Jones,
311 See supra Part III.C.
311 See supra Part III.C.
313 Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 156 (3d Cir. 2009); see also supra notes 213-
17 and accompanying text.
314 See supra Part III.C.
315 See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007).
316 See supra Part III.D.
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courts cannot rely on them as their sole basis for interpreting the
PLRA as barring joinder and, thereby, deviate from the usual
practice under Rule 20(a)(1).
This view, however, does not impinge on courts' discretion
under Rule 20 to deny joinder based on the individual
circumstances of each case. Under the Rule, a court could
prohibit joinder because of a policy concern, such as inmate
coercion, if it found that concern would cause delay, expense, or
any other prejudice to the parties in that particular case." That
said, as the majority explained in Hagan, courts should have the
burden of proving that they exercised this discretion based on
individual, and not generalized, concerns by providing "a
reasoned analysis that comports with the requirements of' Rule
20(a)(1) and addresses the facts of the case. 18
Ultimately, allowing IFP prisoners to join with a collective
filing fee will likely allow courts to avoid, rather than create,
practical and administrative problems. For one, requiring a
collective fee will not undermine the PLRA's financial deterrence
if courts hold joint litigants accountable for both § 1915(g) strikes
and the revocation of good-time credits when any frivolous claim
within a complaint or appeal is dismissed.3 1 9 By making these
potential consequences clear to IFP litigants, courts will likely
dissuade prisoners from filing frivolous actions. Similarly, this
clarity and uniformity will help avoid administrative headaches.
To that end, the argument that courts could not institute an
efficient system for apportioning a collective filing fee is
untenable. Before the enactment of the PLRA, roughly half the
district courts established their own rules or informal policies for
collecting filing fees from IFP prisoners.3 2 0 With the passage of
the PLRA, courts conformed their procedures with the
requirements of the Act.32' Accordingly, if courts create a
uniform standard for joinder with a collective fee, courts will
again adjust their administrative systems to accommodate this
new rule. Moreover, once the administrative system is in place,
317 See supra Part I.
318 Hagan, 570 F.3d at 157.
a' See supra Part IV.A.2.
320 See Cordisco, supra note 70.
321 See id.
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courts may find joinder less bureaucratically challenging than
other options for handling multi-plaintiff actions, such as
consolidation.
B. The Supreme Court Should Resolve the PLRA-Rule 20(a)(1)
Conflict
To create uniformity among the lower courts, the Supreme
Court should determine whether IFP prisoners may join as
plaintiffs under Rule 20(a)(1). Although Congress could amend
the PLRA to address joinder by IFP prisoners, the Supreme
Court is the more appropriate arbiter for this issue. To begin,
one of the primary reasons why the Supreme Court grants
certiorari is to resolve disputes among the circuit courts. As
demonstrated in Part III, four circuit courts have reached three
different results in PLRA-Rule 20(a)(1) cases.2 Given this
circuit split and the inequities it creates among the lower courts,
it would be most appropriate for the Supreme Court to resolve
the PLRA-Rule 20(a)(1) debate and determine whether IFP
prisoners may join as plaintiffs. Correspondingly, the Supreme
Court may resolve the PLRA-Rule 20(a)(1) conflict more
efficiently than Congress, as the process of statutory revision can
be slow, particularly when the amendment at issue is not a high
priority.323  Finally, joinder by IFP prisoners largely concerns
issues of judicial administration and the need for court
efficiency. 324 The Supreme Court has, in a variety of contexts,
relied on these factors as a basis for resolving procedural
disputes.3 25  Further, before the enactment of the PLRA,
Congress generally deferred to the courts to resolve
administration issues related to the procedural requirements of
IFP litigation, such as the processing of IFP applications.2 For
322 See supra Part III.
323 See Genetin, supra note 188, at 691 (characterizing statutory revision as
"slow or cumbersome").
324 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 14.
325 See, e.g., Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S.Ct. 599, 605 (2009) (finding
that prejudgment appeals "undermineD efficient judicial administration") (internal
quotation marks omitted); Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship,
507 U.S. 380, 398 (1993) (holding that lack of prejudice "to the interests of efficient
judicial administration" weighs in favor of permitting the inclusion of a tardy tax
return in a bankruptcy case).
326 See generally FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 14 (stating that the purpose of
the report was to "highlight critical case-management issues" in IFP prisoner
litigation and discuss "management options" for courts implementing the procedural
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these reasons, the Supreme Court should reconcile the decisions
of the lower courts and establish clear standards for Rule 20
joinder by IFP prisoner plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, in the absence of clear guidance from the
Supreme Court or Congress, circuit and district courts have
muddied law as to the availability of joinder by IFP prisoner
plaintiffs. Instead of creating a uniform approach to this
procedural issue, courts' reliance on tools of statutory
interpretation yielded three distinct approaches: a per se rule
prohibiting joinder, joinder with individual filing fees, and
joinder with a collective fee. This lack of uniformity has led to
disparate outcomes in PLRA-Rule 20(a)(1) cases and,
consequently, unequal treatment of IFP prisoner plaintiffs across
jurisdictions.
This Note encourages the Supreme Court to resolve this
procedural problem and concludes that, in light of its decision in
Jones v. Bock, the Court would likely permit joinder by IFP
prisoner plaintiffs. However, until the Supreme Court addresses
this issue, courts should allow IFP prisoners to join as plaintiffs
and pay a collective filing fee. This approach not only comports
with the Court's analysis in Jones, but is supported by the plain
meaning of the PLRA and Rule 20, Congress's legislative intent,
the implied repeals analysis, and public policy considerations.
requirements of the PLRA); Cordisco, supra note 70 (finding that, before the
enactment of the PLRA, many district courts implemented their own policies for
collecting partial filing fees under former § 1915(a)).
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